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ABSTRACT
CROSS -DATASET EVALUATION FOR IOT NETWORK INTRUSION
DETECTION
by
Anjum Farah
The University of Wisconsin -Milwaukee, 2020
Under the Supervision of Professor Rohit J. Kate
With the advent of Internet of Things (IOT) technology, the need to ensure the
security of an IOT network has become important. There are several intrusion
detection systems (IDS) that are available for analyzing and predicting network
anomalies and threats. However, it is challenging to evaluate them to realistically
estimate their performance when deployed. A lot of research has been conducted
where the training and testing is done using the same simulated dataset.
However, realistically, a network on which an intrusion detection model is
deployed will be very different from the network on which it was trained. The aim
of this research is to perform a cross-dataset evaluation using different machine
learning models for IDS. This helps ensure that a model that performs well when
evaluated on one dataset will also perform well when deployed. Two publicly
available simulation datasets., IOTID20 and Bot-IoT datasets created to capture
IOT networks for different attacks such as DoS and Scanning were used for
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training and testing. Machine learning models applied to these datasets were
evaluated within each dataset followed by cross -dataset evaluation. A significant
difference was observed between the results obtained using the two datasets.
Supervised machine learning models were built and evaluated for binary
classification to classify between normal and anomaly attack instances as well as
for multiclass classification to also categorize the type of attack on the IoT
network.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF FIGURES.................................................................................................... VI
LIST OF TABLES..................................................................................................... VII
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ..................................................................................... VIII
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................... IX
1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................. 1
1.1. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................. 1
1.2. MOTIVATIONS AND OBJECTIVES ............................................................................ 3
2. LITERATURE SURVEY .......................................................................................... 5
3. MATERIALS AND METHODS ............................................................................. 16
3.1. TERMINOLOGY ................................................................................................ 16
3.1.1. Different types of attacks ..................................................................... 16
3.1.2. Classification ........................................................................................ 17
3.2. CICFLOWMETER ............................................................................................. 18
3.3. DATASETS...................................................................................................... 18
3.3.1. Bot-IoT Dataset .................................................................................... 19
3.3.2. IOTID20 Dataset ................................................................................... 20
3.4. MACHINE LEARNING METHODS .......................................................................... 23
3.4.1. Naïve Bayes .......................................................................................... 23
3.4.2. Logistic Regression ............................................................................... 23
3.4.3. KNN ...................................................................................................... 24
3.4.4. Decision Trees ...................................................................................... 24
3.4.5. Ensemble ............................................................................................. 24
3.5. EVALUATION METHODS .................................................................................... 25
3.6. METHODOLOGY .............................................................................................. 27
3.6.1. Data Preparation .................................................................................. 27
3.6.1.1 Extracting data ................................................................................ 27
3.6.1.2. Labelling......................................................................................... 28
3.6.1.3. Data Cleaning ................................................................................. 28
3.6.2. Features ............................................................................................... 30
3.6.2.1 Feature Removal ............................................................................. 32
3.6.2.2. Feature Ranking and Distribution................................................... 33
3.6.2.3. Scaling ............................................................................................ 36
3.6.3. Testbed and Experimental Setup ......................................................... 36
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS ............................................................................. 38
4.1. COMPARISON OF RESULTS WITHIN SAME DATASETS .................................................. 38
iv

4.1.1. Binary Classification ............................................................................. 38
4.1.2. Category Classification ........................................................................ 40
4.2 CROSS DATASET EVALUATION RESULTS ................................................................... 42
4.2.1. Binary Classification ............................................................................. 43
4.2.2. Category Classification ........................................................................ 44
4.3. DISCUSSION ................................................................................................... 46
4.4. CHALLENGES .................................................................................................. 48
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK ................................................................... 50
REFERENCES......................................................................................................... 52

v

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Types of Intrusion Detection Systems ..................................................... 2
Figure 2: Bot-IoT Testbed Architecture [25] [26] .................................................. 20
Figure 3 : IoTID20 testbed environment [31] [28] ................................................ 21
Figure 4 : Flow Duration distribution for Bot-IoT dataset ..................................... 34
Figure 5 : Flow Duration distribution for IoTID20 dataset .................................... 34
Figure 6 : Packet Size Average distribution for Bot-IoT dataset ............................ 35
Figure 7 : Packet Size Average for IoTID20 dataset .............................................. 35
Figure 8: Weighted AUC scores for Bot-IoT Binary Classification ......................... 39
Figure 9: Weighted AUC scores for IoTID20 Binary Classification ......................... 40
Figure 10 : AUC value for each category for Bot-IoT ............................................ 41
Figure 11: AUC for each category class for IoTID20 ............................................. 42
Figure 12 : Weighted AUC for Cross-dataset Binary Classification with IoTID20 as
training set and Bot-IoT as test set....................................................................... 43
Figure 13 :Weighted AUC for Cross-dataset Binary Classification with Bot-IoT as
training set and IoTID20 as test set ...................................................................... 44
Figure 14: AUC for Cross-dataset Category Classification with training set as
IoTID20 and test set as Bot-IoT dataset ............................................................... 45
Figure 15: AUC for Cross-dataset Category Classification with training set as BotIoT and test set as IoTID20 dataset ...................................................................... 46

vi

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Literature Review Summary ................................................................... 14
Table 2 : IoTID20 Binary Data Distribution ........................................................... 22
Table 3 : IoTID20 Anomaly Data Distribution ....................................................... 22
Table 4 : Bot-IoT Binary Data ............................................................................... 29
Table 5 : Bot-IoT Anomaly Data ........................................................................... 29
Table 6 : IoTID20 Binary Data ............................................................................... 29
Table 7: IoTID20 Anomaly Data ............................................................................ 30
Table 8 : Feature Description ............................................................................... 32
Table 9 : Deleted Features ................................................................................... 33
Table 10 : Important features using Information Gain ......................................... 33

vii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AUC
DT
DoS
DDoS
IDS
IoT
KDD
ML
NB
RF
ROC
RT
SVM

Area under the ROC curve
Decision Trees
Denial of Service
Distributed Denial of Service
Intrusion Detection System
Internet of Things
Knowledge Data Discovery
Machine Learning
Naïve Bayes
Random Forest
Receiver Operator Characteristics
Random Tree
Support Vector Machines

viii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
First and foremost, I would like to sincerely thank my advisor Dr. Rohit J.
Kate for mentoring me throughout this research. I deeply appreciate his
knowledge on the research topics and his approach in offering helpful solutions. I
am truly grateful for his constant guidance and patience in acknowledging and
encouraging my research interests.
Additionally, I would also like to thank my thesis committee members., Dr.
Zeyun Yu and Dr. Jun Zhang for their invaluable suggestions and guidance.
I wish to thank the Computer Science department at University of
Wisconsin-Milwaukee for providing me the resources especially through the
COVID-19 pandemic to help learn, grow, and pursue my academic aspirations.
Finally, I would like to thank my parents Lubna and Sadiq, my husband
Akram and my siblings, Sabah and Is-haaq for always standing by me and
encouraging me to reach my goals.

ix

1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background
The Internet of Things or commonly referred to as IoT constitutes to a
network of several million devices that are interconnected to each other via the
internet for the purpose of accumulating, sharing, and processing data. In other
words, any of the smart devices connected over wireless networks can be
controlled and used for communication. The application of IoT is widely spread into
several domains ranging from households, commercial, automobiles to industries.
IoT technology is highly scalable and has a huge economic impact on the society.
According to research conducted by McKinsey Global institute [1] in 2015, the IoT
Market is estimated to be valued at $11.1 trillion by 2025 across nine different
sectors. Having several devices connected over the internet is a great cause of
concern for security. Not all data that is transferred over the IoT network is
encrypted and can be vulnerable to different attacks or threats. A lot of research is
being performed to enhance IoT security to create a reliable and secure network.
Solutions provided should adhere to the three basic principles of security that is
confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity. Developing various types of security
measures such as intrusion detection systems for IoT networks have become quite
1

significant and the idea of applying machine learning to IDS is gaining immense
popularity.
Intrusion detection systems refers to a software or a service that can help monitor
or identify anomalous activity within a network or a system. Several machine
learning methods are being implemented to predict anomaly detection within IOT
networks and promised successful results [2]. Intrusion detection systems as seen
in Figure 1., are categorized mainly into two types – Host-based Intrusion detection
systems and Network-based intrusion detection systems. Host based IDS is used to
monitor and secure a single device or host, based on information of the device such

Figure 1: Types of Intrusion Detection Systems

as system logs. Network based IDS is used to monitor an entire network by
accessing and analyzing the flows present within the network.
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Network based IDS are further classified into Packet based IDS and Flow based IDS.
Packet based IDS used the network packet information such as payload or header
information. They are also referred to as Traditional IDS [3]. Flow based IDS on the
other hand uses network flow characteristics such as data rate and byte
information to analyze and monitor anomalies within the network. Flow based IDS
are also called as Network Behavior Analysis [3]. Several supervised or
unsupervised machine learning models are being used that help classify malicious
or anomalous activity within the network.

1.2. Motivations and Objectives
The challenging aspect of creating a machine learning based IDS for an IOT network
is the lack of availability of datasets. Many industries are bound to data privacy and
cannot grant public access to IoT network data. To overcome these issues, several
researchers have simulated a test bed environment and data is gathered from it.
This is later used for the purpose of network analysis, network improvement and
for providing security solutions.
While several machine learning methods used to classify anomalies in the network
have been studied in the past, a common trend seen across is the same simulated
dataset is used for training and testing these models and then very high accuracy is
reported. In an ideal life scenario, the data that is used to train a model would
3

greatly differ when compared to the data that the model will run on when deployed
in production. This can adversely impact the performance of the models when
deployed. The aim of this research is to understand how the performance of the
model varies when different datasets are separately used to train and test the
model. We are using two publicly available simulated datasets to validate the
performance of IDS built using machine learning models. The objective of this
proposed research is to:
- Extract and process data with common features needed to perform
comparison between the two datasets
- Compare the performance of different supervised machine learning
methods on individual datasets for binary and multiclass attack classification
- Perform cross dataset evaluation using the same machine learning methods
for binary and multiclass attack classification
- Analyze the challenges and performance results
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows. In Section 2, we perform literature
survey to understand the datasets and methods used in previous papers. In
Section 3, we overview the materials and methods required as part of this
research. In Section 4, we discuss the results and challenges. In Section 5, we
present the conclusions and future work.
4

2. LITERATURE SURVEY
In this section, we will discuss the different types of intrusion detection systems
created for the purpose of identifying anomalous behavior in networks as well as
in IoT networks, the different datasets used, and the evaluation metrics adopted.
Several datasets have been simulated for the use of IDS. One of the datasets that
has been used for quite long for the purpose of building a predictive IDS is the KDD
CUP 99 [4] [5] that has both training and test sets available. The dataset consists of
normal and attack instances. The attacks are Denial of Service (DoS), probe attacks,
Remote to Local(R2L) and User-to-root(U2R). Obeidat, I. et al. [6] in their paper
used the KDD CUP 99 datasets and applied different machine learning models to
create an IDS. The different machine learning models used were decision trees,
naïve bayes, multilayer perceptron, random forests, and random tree. The AUC for
each of these classifiers was reported as 0.969, 0.969, 0.990, 0.996 and 0.953,
respectively. However, the paper uses accuracy scores to evaluate the different
classifiers. It does not specify the scores for each category and all the features of
KDD where taken into consideration.
A newer version of KDDCUP99 was introduced named the NSL-KDD as the former
suffered with issues in redundancies in the training and test sets and class
imbalance in attacks [7] [8]. The NSL KDD consists of different train and test files.
5

Gao X. et al. [9] in his paper performs multi-class classification using an ensemble
machine learning model and compares accuracy with other machine learning
methods. The accuracy on the test sets for decision tree is 79.71%, for random
forests is 76.64%, on is 75.51%, Logistic Regression is 73.58%, SVM is 74.09%, DNN
is 81.6% and adaboost is 76.02%. Their proposed ensemble machine learning
method is that of a multitree that and gives the highest accuracy score of 84.23%.
This paper uses accuracy metric to draw comparisons between the different
model’s performances. The scores for each classification label are not mentioned.
DH Deshmukh et al. [10] in their paper further improved the accuracy of the NSL
KDD dataset by performing preprocessing on the training and test datasets prior to
applying the machine learning models. Correlation based feature selection and
data discretization was done on the data followed by which they report an accuracy
of 88.20% for Naïve Bayes, 93.40% for Hidden Naïve Bayes and the highest of
94.20% for Naïve Bayes Tree. This paper uses accuracy metric to draw comparisons,
which does not help in understanding the performance based on the class
distribution of the datasets.
A relatively newer dataset named as ISCX-IDS-2012 was created for the purpose of
network intrusion detection by Ali A. et al. [11] [12]. This dataset consists of wide
array of different attacks within a network over a range of different network
6

protocols such as HTTP, SMTP, SSH, POP3, IMAP, and FTP. M.J. Vargas et al. [13]
used Bayesian networks to perform anomaly detection in networks using the ISCXIDS-2012 dataset. Their paper reports accuracies across uniflow, bi-flows and
aggregated flows as 99.95%, 99.92% and 99.92% respectively by generating flowbased features for the model. Their Bayesian network classifier heavily relies on the
flow identification features like the source and destination IP address to perform
prediction. This can cause an issue when the model comes across an attack from a
different IP address which was not observed in the training set. A different
approach was adopted by S.N. Mighan et al. [14] in his paper to perform anomaly
detection on the UNB ICSX-IDS 2012 dataset. They used deep learning in
combination with support vector machines to perform binary classification which
provides an accuracy of 90.2%. The paper does not comment on the class
imbalance and does not report weighted accuracies for their model.
A newer dataset named as CICIDS2017 was created that consisted of more common
attacks such as DoS, DDoS, Brute Force, XSS, SQL Injection, Infiltration, Port scan
and Botnet [15] [16]. This dataset consists of a total of 80 flow-based features
generated using CICFlowMeter [17] [18]. S. Ustabay et al. [19] in their paper used
the CICIDS2017 dataset to create an Intrusion detection system using recursive
feature elimination by random forest classifier and deep learning model. The flow
7

identifier features were eliminated. The original dataset was reduced by 95% and
this was split into 80% for training and rest 20% for testing. The model performs
binary classification and reports an AUC score of 0.96.
The CICIDS2017 dataset was used for binary classification by Arif Y. et al. [20] to
create an IDS with a synthetic minority oversampling technique or SMOTE to
overcome the class imbalance in the dataset. The flow identifier features were
eliminated, and the dataset was split into 70% training and 30% test data. The
AdaBoost machine learning algorithm was applied to a total of 25 features selected
using principal component analysis (PCA) and accuracy of 81.83% was achieved
with an AUC score of 0.92.
A more realistic network IDS dataset was created by Nour M. et. al [21] [22] that
captured a wider range of attacks named UNSW-NB15. The attacks simulated
within the network are Fuzzers, Analysis, Backdoors, DoS, Exploits, Reconnaissance,
shellcode, and worms. The dataset has binary labels for attack or normal instance,
attack category labels as well as further categorized sub-category attack labels with
a total of 49 features. Mustapha B. et.al [23] implement a RepTree algorithm on
UNSW-NB15 and NSL-KDD datasets and perform both binary and multiclass
classification to create an IDS. The authors split the UNSW-NB15 into training and
test sets and use feature selection followed by which they apply a two-level
8

classifier(RepTree) and report an accuracy of 88.95% on UNSW-NB15 for binary
classification and 81.28% for multiclass classification. As for NSL-KDD dataset, they
report an accuracy of 89.95% for binary classification and 83.59% for multi-class
classification. The paper does not report AUC for the different classes and does not
take class imbalance into consideration. Moving onto unsupervised machine
learning methods, Liu X. et. al [24] applied a feed forward neural network learning
model on the UNSW-NB15 dataset that consists of 10 hidden layers for multiclass
classification to detect anomalies. They perform 10-fold cross validation on 60% of
training data, used 10% of data as validation set and achieve an accuracy of 99.5%
on 30% test data and AUC of 1.0. The model uses all features and does not disregard
the flow identifiers.
The above datasets mentioned so far were mainly used for Intrusion detection
systems within networks and do not contain any smart devices that are present
within an IoT network. An approach was made to simulate an IOT network in the
Bot-IoT dataset by Nicholaos K. et al. [25] [26] by connecting smart devices and
sensors within the network. Different attacks such as Port Scanning, DoS,
Distributed DoS, Information theft were performed within the network and the
instances were labelled accordingly. The authors extracted 10 best features which
do not contain the flow identifiers from the entire set of 47 features and used three
9

different classifier machine learning methods to train and test the dataset. They
used support vector machines, recurrent neural networks, and LSTM- recurrent
neural networks. 5% of the entire data was used for the purpose of training and
testing. Results were reported for both binary classification and multiclass
classification. The confusion matrices for binary were reported for all three
classifiers and confusion matrices for RNN were reported for multiclass
classification. In addition, the accuracy scores were for each attack category were
mentioned. The AUC scores for SVM, RNN and LSTM-RNN were 0.976 ,0.99 and
1.00, respectively.
Another supervised learning approach with a newer algorithm – Bijective soft set
technique was applied on the Bot-IoT dataset to classify attacks by Muhammad S.
et. al [27]. The authors used Bayes Net, Naïve Bayes, C4.5 decision trees, Random
Forest and Random Tree fed to the bijective soft set technique which uses different
machine learning models to train and test. The ML method that presented the best
results is returned by the bijective soft set technique. Three classifiers namely DT,
RF and Random Trees reported an accuracy of 99.99% while Bayes Net and Naïve
Bayes reported an accuracy of 99.77% and 99.79%, respectively for binary
classification. The paper does not mention weighted accuracies or area under curve
scoring metrics for the classification performed.
10

Another IOT network intrusion detection dataset (IoTID) was publicly made
available by the HCR Lab [28] . This dataset simulates an IOT network by using smart
devices. The dataset consists of different attacks and normal instances in the form
of raw network packet files. Liu Z. et. al [29] used the IoTID dataset [28] to perform
anomaly detection by using various machine learning methods. The packet data
was extracted into CSV files and split into 75% for training data and 25% for testing
data. The results for binary classification for Random Forest was the highest with
an accuracy of 100%, followed by KNN with an accuracy of 99%. XGBoost algorithm
gave an accuracy of 97%, logistic regression was 86% and the poorest performance
was that of SVM with an accuracy of 79%. The confusion matrices for each method
were reported to better evaluate the result. All the machine learning models rely
only on the basic flow identifiers to perform binary classification. The weighted
accuracies were not reported for any models to understand the class imbalance.
The IoTID [28] dataset paved way for the creation of another Intrusion detection
dataset with more features., IoTID20 [30] [31]for the purpose of anomaly detection
in IoT networks. The authors of the IoTID20 [30] [31] dataset also performed binary
as well as multiclass classification on the dataset and reported the accuracy scores
for different classifier methods by using cross validation. The F-Scores were also
reported for binary classification and category classification. The decision tree
11

classifier gave the highest accuracy of 88%, followed by ensemble classifier with an
accuracy of 87%. The accuracies for Random Forest, Naïve Bayes, Linear
Discriminant Analysis, Logistic Regression and SVM are 84%, 73%, 70%, 40% and
40%, respectively. The paper specifies the F1-score for each attack category class;
however, it does not report AUC scores or weighted accuracies and takes the flow
identifiers into account for features. The IDS created will fail to provide better
results when deployed in production.
The latest dataset for an IoT network is the Ton-IOT Telemetry dataset [32] [33]
that provides heterogenous data at different layers within a IoT network, i.e., edge
layer, fog layer and cloud layer. The Ton-IOT telemetry dataset makes use of
different sensors and smart devices, and a wide range of attacks were simulated.
The data collected individually for each of these devices were combined to form a
larger dataset and different machine learning models were applied to the individual
datasets as well as the combined IIOT dataset to perform binary and multiclass
classification. 80% of the data was used for training and 20% was used for testing,
followed by which a 4-fold cross validation was performed on the training data. The
accuracy scores for each of the models and devices were mentioned for both binary
and multiclass classification. CART decision trees performed the best with an
accuracy of 88% for binary and 77% for multiclass classification. The paper does not
12

mention weighted accuracy or AUC to better evaluate the class distribution within
the dataset. The datasets and the highest scoring machine learning model and the
performance metrics reported are summarized in the Table 1 below.

Dataset

Paper

Classification

Highest
Scoring ML
Model

KDD-CUP 99

Obeidat, I. et al. [6]

Binary

Random
forests

Gao X. et al. [9]

Multi-class

DH Deshmukh et al. [10]

Binary

NSL-KDD

Mustapha B. et.al [23]
ISCX-IDS2012

Binary
Multi-class

Value

AUC

0.996

Accuracy

0.99

Accuracy

0.8423

Accuracy

0.942

0.8995

Two-level
RepTree

Accuracy
Accuracy

0.9995

0.8359

M.J. Vargas et al. [13]

Binary

Bayesian
Networks

S.N. Mighan et al. [14]

Binary

SVM

Accuracy

0.9020

S. Ustabay et al. [19]

Binary

Recursive
feature
elimination
by random
forest
classifier and
deep
learning
model

AUC

0.96

Arif Y. et al. [20]

Binary

PCA+ SMOTE
+ AdaBoost

Accuracy

0.8183

AUC

0.92

CICIDS2017

UNSWNB15

Ensemble
(Multitree)
Feature
selection +
data
discretization
+ Naïve
Bayes Tree

Performance
Metric

Mustapha B. et.al [23]
Liu X. et. al [22]

Binary
Multi-class
Binary

0.8895

Two-level
RepTree

Accuracy

Neural
Network

AUC

1

LSTM-RNN

AUC

1

0.8128

Binary
Bot-IoT

Nicholaos K. et al. [23] [24]
Multi-class
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IOTID

Muhammad S. et. al [25]

Binary

Bijective soft
set - Decision
trees,
Random
Forest, and
Random Tree

Liu Z. et. al [27]

binary

Random
Forest

Binary
IoTID20

I. Ullah and Q. H. Mahmoud
[28]

Category Classification
Sub-category
classification

Ton-IOT

A. Alsaedi. Et. al [30] [31]

Binary
Multi-class

Decision
Tree and
Random
Forest
Decision
Tree
Decision
Tree
CART

Accuracy

0.9999

Accuracy

1

F-Score

1

F-Score

1

Accuracy

0.87

Accuracy

0.88
0.77

Table 1: Literature Review Summary

As it can be seen from the above table, the accuracy reported for several models
and datasets is extremely high. Several models take the basic flow identifiers like
the IP addresses and timestamps into consideration while developing the IDS. Using
such features to develop an IDS lead to achieving 100% accuracy for the models.
Alternatively, the training and testing sets contain the same simulated attacks for
a given dataset, which can present misleading performance metrics, since attacks
simulated in a test environment can differ to ones the IDS will face when deployed.
This gives rise to the need of cross-dataset evaluation to analyze the performance
of a model. Several other domains have adopted the idea of evaluating the
performance of machine-learning methods using a cross-dataset. In the field of
14

neuroscience, M. Lorbach et. al [34] performed cross-dataset evaluation to
recognize social behavior in rats. The authors use an interaction classifier and
report the F1-score to evaluate their model. The f1-score when trained and tested
with RatSI and Validation datasets respectively is 0.54 and when reversed gives an
f1-score of 0.72. Similarly, Y.Chen et.al [35] perform cross-dataset evaluation for
the purpose of activity recognition in humans using transfer learning. The accuracy
is reported for after cross-evaluating with four different datasets.
F. Sha et.al [36] perform cross dataset evaluation for the purpose of answering
visual questions. The models are trained using one dataset and evaluated using
other datasets. Binary classification is performed using deep learning. The accuracy
results reported within the dataset versus the results evaluated using other
datasets report great differences. For instance, the VQA dataset reports an
accuracy of 65.7% within the dataset and when evaluated with Visual7W dataset
reports an accuracy of 53.4%.
Cross dataset evaluation thereby helps in understanding if an IDS created using a
single dataset is likely to perform well when deployed.

15

3. MATERIALS AND METHODS
In this section, we describe the datasets used, preprocessing performed, features
used, and the machine learning methods applied to the dataset. In addition, we
also mention the classification performed and metrics used to evaluate the
classifiers.

3.1. Terminology
3.1.1. Different types of attacks
An IoT network is vulnerable to different types of attacks and is prone to several
weaknesses. Hardware, software, and network challenge can hinder the
performance of an IoT network, additionally devices present within a smart home
are vulnerable to Distributed DoS, DoS, malware, and impersonation attacks [37].
As part of this research, we are considering two of the attacks that are commonly
observed in an IoT network and are described below
- Denial of Service (DoS): A denial of service or DoS attack occurs when
legitimate users are unable to access resources, such as network,
information system or devices due to the presence of a malicious code. This
attack is established by inundating the network with traffic or flooding the
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information systems with requests so that it crashes or fails to respond to
the legitimate user.
- Scanning: Scanning attacks occur when attackers can scan devices within a
given network to gather information either by scanning ports, IP address or
OS and version. These attacks help the adversaries to obtain personal
information that can be later used to launch other attacks.
3.1.2. Classification
Classification refers to the task of assigning labels to examples with the help of
machine learning algorithms. The value to be predicted is called as class label or
target. It can also be viewed as a predictive modeling problem that can help
distinguish one instance from another using the input variables and applying a
function to obtain the target class.
- Binary classification: Binary classification is the task of classifying the output
variables into two target variables or classes. The IoT network instances are
mainly classified into two types.
• Normal - This represents no attack on the network
• Anomaly – This represents an attack on the network

17

- Multiclass or Category classification: Multiclass classification is the task of
mapping machine learning algorithms on input variables to classify more
than 2 targets variables or classes. The class labels for the attacks on the IoT
network can be classified as follows.
• Normal – This indicates no attack on the network
• Scan – This indicates the type of attack on the IoT network is a scanning
attack.
• DoS – This indicates the attack on the IoT network is Denial of Service

3.2. CICFlowmeter
CICFlowmeter is a network traffic generator and analyzer software. It is used to
understand flows present in the network packets. It can determine bi-directional
flows based on the protocols – TCP and UDP. In addition, it generates a CSV file
from raw network packet (pcap) files with several time-based features that can be
used for network analysis. It is predominantly used for intrusion detection systems
[17] [38] [18].

3.3. Datasets
To perform cross-dataset evaluation, this research uses two publicly available IoT
network intrusion detection datasets i.e., Bot-IoT dataset [17] and the IoTID20[20]
datasets. Both these datasets simulated the attacks caused on an IOT network.
18

3.3.1. Bot-IoT Dataset
The Bot-IoT [25] [26] dataset set up a testbed with simulated IoT devices, normal
and attacking virtual machines and network devices. The Node-red tool [39] was
used to simulate 5 IoT devices i.e., the weather station, smart fridge, motion
activated lights, smart garage door, and a smart thermostat. In addition, a firewall
and two network interface cards were configured into the testbed environment.
The IoT simulated devices were connected to the Ubuntu server. The normal traffic
data was generated using Ostinato network monitoring and testing tool [40] that
was used to extract data from the target machines which were ubuntu mobile,
windows machines and ubuntu server. Kali Linux machines were used to simulate
the attacks. The attacks simulated were DDoS, DoS, Scanning and information theft.
The data collected was then labelled based on the hacking machines IP addresses
and features were extracted. [25] [26]. The testbed architecture is presented in the
Figure 2 below.
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Figure 2: Bot-IoT Testbed Architecture [25] [26]

The dataset consisted of 69.3 GB of raw network packet files. The formatted csv
files extracted amounted to 16.7GB. A smaller set was extracted for the purpose of
training and testing that contains over 3 million records. The scanning attacks were
further classified into OS scan and Port Scan. DDoS and DoS attacks were
categorized further based on the protocols i.e., TCP, HTTP and UDP. The scanning
attacks were simulated using the Nmap and Hping3 software and the DoS attacks
were simulated using the Hping3 tool.
3.3.2. IOTID20 Dataset
The IoTID20 [30] used the raw network packet files created by the IoTID [28]
dataset. For the purpose of creating an IoT network, two smart home devices – SKT
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NUGU(NU 100) which is an AI-based speaker and EZVIZ Wi-Fi Camera (C2C Mini O
Plus 1080P) along with different smart phones and laptops were connected to the
same wireless network using a smart home Wi-Fi router. The network packet files
were then captured using the wireless adaptor’s monitor mode. Attacks like DoS,
Scanning and Man in the middle were simulated using Nmap tools. The attacks
packets for Mirai botnet were generated separately using a laptop and were later
changed to simulate its origination from the IoT devices [28]. The testbed
architecture is presented in the Figure 3 below.

Figure 3 : IoTID20 testbed environment [31] [28]
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The IoTID20 dataset used these packet files and created CSV files using the
CICFlowMeter [18] [17]. The CSV files generated were then labelled accordingly for
anomaly and types of attacks based on the IP addresses. The distribution of the
dataset is mentioned in Table 2 and Table 3 below.

Binary Label

Instances

Anomaly

585710

Normal

40073

Table 2 : IoTID20 Binary Data Distribution

Category

Instances

DoS

59391

Mirai

415677

MITM

35377

Scan

PortOS

53073

HostPort

22192

75265

Table 3 : IoTID20 Anomaly Data Distribution
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3.4. Machine Learning Methods
Different machine learning based classifiers are used for the purpose of predicting
binary and multiclass labels. The following machine learning methods described
have been used as part of this research
3.4.1. Naïve Bayes
The Naïve Bayes classifier uses the Bayes theorem to perform classification. This
model assumes the conditional independence of the features given the target. X
represents the features of the dataset and Y represent the target class or variable.
The likelihood of an instance belonging to a certain class can be determined using
the formula below. This can be extended to perform both binary and multiclass
classification.
𝑛

𝑃(𝑋1 … 𝑋𝑛 |𝑌) = ∏ 𝑃(𝑋𝑖 |𝑌)
𝑖=1

3.4.2. Logistic Regression
Logistic Regression machine method models on “sigmoid function” or “logistic
function” to perform predictive analysis. It helps predict the likelihood of a target
occurring for a given instance. [41].
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3.4.3. KNN
K-Nearest Neighbor or k-NN machine learning method is also called as a lazy
learning algorithm. It is used for the purpose of predictive analysis and performs
classification of a given instance based on the Euclidean distance from its “k”
nearest neighbors. It then labels the instances based on the majority class value of
its neighbors.
3.4.4. Decision Trees
A decision tree machine learning model is a simple and widely used supervised
machine learning method that can perform both binary and multiclass
classification. This method models on decision trees where the internal nodes are
features. The path can be viewed as a classification rule and leaf node represents
label or class.
3.4.5. Ensemble
Ensembles makes use of different machine learning methods to perform predictive
analysis to classify a given task at hand. Random Forest is an ensemble of decision
trees that can be used to provide better performance and results as they are less
prone to overfitting when compared to decision trees.
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3.5. Evaluation Methods
It is crucial to use the right metric to evaluate a machine learning model’s
performance. If the correct evaluation measure is not used, the machine learning
model may perform poorly when it is deployed in real life. Some standard
evaluation metrics are described below.
- Confusion Matrix: A confusion matrix is a N x N table that can help determine
the performance of a machine learning model. From the confusion matrix
one can infer the following
• True Positive (TP): The actual value is true, and model predicts true.
• False Positive (FP): This is also called as Type I Error; the actual value is
false, and the model predicts true.
• True Negative (TN): The actual value is false, and model predicts false
• False Negative (FN): This is also called as Type II Error, the actual value
is true, and model predicts false.
- ROC-AUC: ROC stands for Receiver Operating Characteristics. ROC is a curve
mapped with model’s sensitivity versus the model’s false positive rate. These
values can be calculated using the below formulae.
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• Sensitivity (True Positive Rate):

This is the fraction of positive

instances that the model classifies as positive correctly. Sensitivity can
be calculated as
𝑇𝑃𝑅 =

𝑇𝑃
𝐹𝑁 + 𝑇𝑃

• Specificity (True Negative Rate): This is the fraction of negative
instances that the model classifies as negative correctly. Specificity can
be calculated as
𝑇𝑁𝑅 =

𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃

• False positive Rate: This is the fraction of negative instances that the
model misclassifies as positive. FPR can also be viewed as 1-specificity
and can be calculated as
𝐹𝑃𝑅 =

𝐹𝑃
𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃

ROC curve of a model is not affected by imbalanced classes. AUC or Area
under the curve is a single value that calculates the area under the ROC
curve. AUC values range from 0 to 1.0 which can help determine the
performance of the model. The higher AUC value, the better the model
performs. So the AUC of 1.0 indicates that the models classifies all the
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instances correctly. AUC of 0.5 can be obtained using the baseline of random
classification.

3.6. Methodology
In this section, the methods used for data extraction, labelling and data cleaning
are mentioned followed by the features and testbed used to perform machine
learning experiments.
3.6.1. Data Preparation
The Bot-IoT dataset and the IoTID20 dataset can be accessed publicly from [25] and
[31] respectively. The training and testing files presented in the Bot-IoT dataset
cannot be directly used for cross-dataset evaluation, as the features are not in sync
with the IOTID20 dataset. For this research, only scanning and DoS attack instances
are considered, since the simulation of the Mirai Botnet or DDoS attacks vary highly
between the two datasets. The process of extracting newer features from the raw
packet files and labelling the records is described in detail.
3.6.1.1 Extracting data
The Bot-IoT dataset [26] [25] consisted of 69.9 GB of raw network packet files. We
employed the scheme used by IoTID20[20] to extract similar features. The raw
network packet files were downloaded. As this research intends to classify between
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DoS, Scanning and normal features only, the respective raw packet files were used
and flow-based features were extracted using the CICFlowmeter [38] [17] [18]. A
total of 83 features were extracted.
3.6.1.2. Labelling
The generated CSV file from above was then labelled using the labelled CSV files
presented in the Bot-IoT dataset [25] [26]. The files were loaded to a MySQL table
and the flow identifiers such as the source ip address , destination ip address , port
numbers and protocols were used to add binary labels and category attack labels
which are DoS, Scan and Normal.
3.6.1.3. Data Cleaning
The IoTID20 and the Bot-IoT files were checked for duplicates and the duplicated
instances were deleted. A total of 229029 instances were deleted from the IotID20
dataset. The data extracted from the Bot-IoT dataset consisted of huge files, to be
able to draw better comparisons, the instances for DoS, Scan and normal were
extracted using python scripts. The table below mentions the number of instances
used for each dataset. The subcategory column within the IoTID20 dataset was also
removed. The data distribution for these two datasets is mentioned below in
Table 4 and Table 5 for bot-IoT dataset and Table 6 and Table 7 for IoTID20.
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Bot-IoT dataset

Binary Label

Instances

Anomaly

77573

Normal

4938

Table 4 : Bot-IoT Binary Data

Bot-IoT Anomaly Distribution

Category

Instances

DoS

61164

Scan

16409

Table 5 : Bot-IoT Anomaly Data

IoTID20 dataset
Binary Label

Instances

Anomaly

77157

Normal

38598

Table 6 : IoTID20 Binary Data
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IoTID20 Anomaly Distribution
Category

Instances

DoS

59390

Scan

17767

Table 7: IoTID20 Anomaly Data

3.6.2. Features
The time and flow based features extracted using CICFlowmeter [38] [17] [18] and
the description for each of these features is mentioned in Table 8 below.
Feature Name
Flow ID
Src IP
Src Port
Dst IP
Dst Port
Protocol
Timestamp
Flow duration
total Fwd Packet
total Bwd packets
total Length of Fwd Packet
total Length of Bwd Packet
Fwd Packet Length Min
Fwd Packet Length Max
Fwd Packet Length Mean
Fwd Packet Length Std
Bwd Packet Length Min
Bwd Packet Length Max
Bwd Packet Length Mean
Bwd Packet Length Std

Feature Description
Flow Identifier
Source IP Address
Source Port Number
Destination IP Address
Destination Port Number
Internet Protocol used
Timestamp of the packet
Duration of the flow in Microsecond
Total packets in the forward direction
Total packets in the backward direction
Total size of packet in forward direction
Total size of packet in backward direction
Minimum size of packet in forward direction
Maximum size of packet in forward direction
Mean size of packet in forward direction
Standard deviation size of packet in forward direction
Minimum size of packet in backward direction
Maximum size of packet in backward direction
Mean size of packet in backward direction
Standard deviation size of packet in backward direction
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Flow Bytes/s
Flow Packets/s
Flow IAT Mean
Flow IAT Std
Flow IAT Max
Flow IAT Min
Fwd IAT Min
Fwd IAT Max
Fwd IAT Mean
Fwd IAT Std
Fwd IAT Total
Bwd IAT Min
Bwd IAT Max
Bwd IAT Mean
Bwd IAT Std
Bwd IAT Total
Fwd PSH flags
Bwd PSH Flags
Fwd URG Flags
Bwd URG Flags
Fwd Header Length
Bwd Header Length
FWD Packets/s
Bwd Packets/s
Packet Length Min
Packet Length Max
Packet Length Mean
Packet Length Std
Packet Length Variance
FIN Flag Count
SYN Flag Count
RST Flag Count
PSH Flag Count
ACK Flag Count
URG Flag Count
CWR Flag Count
ECE Flag Count
down/Up Ratio
Average Packet Size
Fwd Segment Size Avg
Bwd Segment Size Avg
Fwd Bytes/Bulk Avg
Fwd Packet/Bulk Avg
Fwd Bulk Rate Avg
Bwd Bytes/Bulk Avg
Bwd Packet/Bulk Avg
Bwd Bulk Rate Avg
Subflow Fwd Packets

Number of flow bytes per second
Number of flow packets per second
Mean time between two packets sent in the flow
Standard deviation time between two packets sent in the flow
Maximum time between two packets sent in the flow
Minimum time between two packets sent in the flow
Minimum time between two packets sent in the forward direction
Maximum time between two packets sent in the forward direction
Mean time between two packets sent in the forward direction
Standard deviation time between two packets sent in the forward direction
Total time between two packets sent in the forward direction
Minimum time between two packets sent in the backward direction
Maximum time between two packets sent in the backward direction
Mean time between two packets sent in the backward direction
Standard deviation time between two packets sent in the backward direction
Total time between two packets sent in the backward direction
Number of times the PSH flag was set in packets travelling in the forward direction (0 for
UDP)
Number of times the PSH flag was set in packets travelling in the backward direction (0 for
UDP)
Number of times the URG flag was set in packets travelling in the forward direction (0 for
UDP)
Number of times the URG flag was set in packets travelling in the backward direction (0 for
UDP)
Total bytes used for headers in the forward direction
Total bytes used for headers in the backward direction
Number of forward packets per second
Number of backward packets per second
Minimum length of a packet
Maximum length of a packet
Mean length of a packet
Standard deviation length of a packet
Variance length of a packet
Number of packets with FIN
Number of packets with SYN
Number of packets with RST
Number of packets with PUSH
Number of packets with ACK
Number of packets with URG
Number of packets with CWR
Number of packets with ECE
Download and upload ratio
Average size of packet
Average size observed in the forward direction
Average number of bytes bulk rate in the backward direction
Average number of bytes bulk rate in the forward direction
Average number of packets bulk rate in the forward direction
Average number of bulk rate in the forward direction
Average number of bytes bulk rate in the backward direction
Average number of packets bulk rate in the backward direction
Average number of bulk rate in the backward direction
The average number of packets in a sub flow in the forward direction
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Subflow Fwd Bytes
Subflow Bwd Packets
Subflow Bwd Bytes
Fwd Init Win bytes
Bwd Init Win bytes
Fwd Act Data Pkts
Fwd Seg Size Min
Active Min
Active Mean
Active Max
Active Std
Idle Min
Idle Mean
Idle Max
Idle Std
Label
Cat

The average number of bytes in a sub flow in the forward direction
The average number of packets in a sub flow in the backward direction
The average number of bytes in a sub flow in the backward direction
The total number of bytes sent in initial window in the forward direction
The total number of bytes sent in initial window in the backward direction
Count of packets with at least 1 byte of TCP data payload in the forward direction
Minimum segment size observed in the forward direction
Minimum time a flow was active before becoming idle
Mean time a flow was active before becoming idle
Maximum time a flow was active before becoming idle
Standard deviation time a flow was active before becoming idle
Minimum time a flow was idle before becoming active
Mean time a flow was idle before becoming active
Maximum time a flow was idle before becoming active
Standard deviation time a flow was idle before becoming active
Anomaly or Normal
Category of attack or Normal

Table 8 : Feature Description

3.6.2.1 Feature Removal
To ensure that the model performs well, it was important to delete the flow
identifiers of a network packet like the source and destination IP address, the port
numbers, and the timestamp. If the model is trained using these features, it will fail
to generalize well when deployed as attackers can use different IP addresses and
times to launch attacks on the network. In addition to this, 10 more features were
deleted as they consisted of a single value after the data was extracted using the
CICFlowmeter [38] [17] [18] across the dataset and would not add any value to the
machine learning models. The features deleted are mentioned in the Table 9 below.
A total of 67 features were then used to train the models.
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Features Deleted

Flow ID, Src IP, Dst IP, Src Port, Timestamp ,Dst Port, Fwd PSH Flags, Fwd URG Flags, Fwd
Byts/b Avg, Fwd Pkts/b Avg, Fwd Blk Rate Avg, Bwd Byts/b Avg, Bwd Pkts/b Avg, Bwd Blk
Rate Avg, Init Fwd Win Byts, Fwd Seg Size Min

Table 9 : Deleted Features

3.6.2.2. Feature Ranking and Distribution
Information gain is a measure that helps determine how informative a feature is
achieved by decreasing the uncertainty or entropy of the dataset [42]. Higher
information gain has lower entropy. In order to understand how the features are
distributed and the information gain for features, we used WEKA [43] software to
calculate the information gain for each feature using the ranker method. The Table
10 below mention the top 10 features for Bot-IoT dataset and IoTID20 dataset.
Bot-IoT Dataset

IoTID20 Dataset

Pkt Size Avg

Flow Duration

Pkt Len Mean

Flow Pkts/s

Tot Len Bwd Pkts

Idle Mean

Subflow Bwd Byts

Idle Max

Bwd Pkt Len Max

Flow IAT Max

Bwd Seg Size Avg

Flow IAT Mean

Bwd Pkt Len Mean

Init Bwd Win Byts

Pkt Len Max

Bwd Pkts/s

Flow Byts/s

Bwd IAT Tot

Flow Duration

Idle Min

Table 10 : Important features using Information Gain
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To better understand the how features are distributed across both models, the bell
curve for both the datasets is visualized using the RapidMiner Studio [44].

Figure 4 : Flow Duration distribution for Bot-IoT dataset

Figure 5 : Flow Duration distribution for IoTID20 dataset
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Figure 6 : Packet Size Average distribution for Bot-IoT dataset

Figure 7 : Packet Size Average for IoTID20 dataset

As it can be inferred from the above images the features are not evenly distributed
across both the datasets. The distribution varies because of the different testbed
used for data simulation. A given network can have packets with varying length as
well as the flow duration for each packet can vary differently. An effective IDS
should be able to reflect these different distributions.
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3.6.2.3. Scaling
Scaling is the technique ensures that different values present for a given feature
can be fit into a common range so that the outliers or larger values present for that
feature do not dominate the performance of a model. Different techniques are
present to scale the data like standard scaling, min-max scaling, and robust scaling.
Robust scaling is obtained by subtracting the median of the values from the value
itself divided by the interquartile range of the values present in the feature [45].
The formula to perform robust scaling for values of a feature is described below.
𝑆𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 =

𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 − 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑠

Since the data was not normally distributed across different features, a robust
scaling was performed to help enhance the performance of machine learning
algorithms. Robust scaling was opted as it is less prone to being misled by the
outliers when compared to standard scaling or min-max scaling. [46]
3.6.3. Testbed and Experimental Setup
For all experimental results presented in this section, we used 64-bit Windows 8
operating system on a PC with 1.80 GHz Intel core i7 CPU, 4MB cache and 8GB of
RAM. The programming language used was python and data formatting were done
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using Pandas [47] which is a data analysis library. The machine learning models
were implemented using the Scikit-Learn library [46].
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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we discuss the results for different supervised machine learning
models. Section 4.1 reports the model’s performance using the same dataset by
splitting the data into 80% training and 20% testing. Section 4.2 reports the model’s
performance with cross-dataset.

4.1. Comparison of results within same datasets
4.1.1. Binary Classification
The AUC weighted average was calculated for each model on the Bot-IoT dataset
and the values are plotted in the Figure 8 .
A 10-fold cross evaluation was performed on the training data for parameter
selection for the IoTID20 binary classification. The parameters selected for the
decision tree classifier involve increasing the minimum number of samples needed
to split a node from 2 to 8, increasing the minimum number of samples needed at
the leaf from 1 to 10 and the maximum features to look when splitting a node is
the square root of all features. This model was used for both binary and category
classification. The parameters chosen for k-nearest neighbor method was setting
the k value to 31, algorithm used to compute the nearest neighbors was ball tree
and the weights function was set to distance (i.e., neighbors closer to the instance
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to be classified have higher influence compared to the neighbors far away) [46].
The ensemble used was a bagging classifier which used decision trees as the base
estimator and the number of estimators used were 150. This model was used for
both the datasets. As for the Bot-IoT dataset, all the other models performed very
well with the default parameters in the scikit-learn library [46].
The AUC weighted average for IoTID20 dataset and is presented in the Figure 9.
Bot-IoT Binary Classification
1

0.98

0.99

0.96

0.9
0.8

0.71

Weighted AUC

0.7

0.63

0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
DecisionTree
DecisionTree

kNN(k=5)
kNN(k=5)

Naïve Bayes
Naïve Bayes

Logistic
Regression

Logistic Regression

Ensemble
Ensemble

Figure 8: Weighted AUC scores for Bot-IoT Binary Classification
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IoTID20 Binary Classification
1

0.96

0.96

0.95
0.84

0.9

Weighted AUC

0.8
0.7
0.6

0.53

0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
DecisionTree

kNN(k=31)

Naïve Bayes

Logistic
Regression

Ensemble

Figure 9: Weighted AUC scores for IoTID20 Binary Classification

As observed from the above two figures, the models perform very well and can
detect anomalies within the dataset. The scores reported for decision tree, k-NN
and ensemble are above 0.95 for both the datasets.
4.1.2. Category Classification
A 10-fold cross evaluation was performed on the training data for parameter
selection for the Bot-IoT category classification. The parameters selected for the
decision tree classifier involve increasing the minimum number of samples needed
to split a node from 2 to 8, increasing the minimum number of samples needed at
the leaf from 1 to 50 and the maximum features to look when splitting a node is
the square root of all features. The parameters chosen for k-nearest neighbor
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method was setting the k value to 11. As for the IoTID20 dataset, all the other
models performed very well with the default parameters in the scikit-learn library
[46].
The AUC value for each attack class category and the AUC weighted average for
each model is plotted for both the Bot-IoT and IoTID20 datasets and presented in
the figures below.
Bot-IoT Category Classification
1

0.98 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.98
0.98 0.97
0.95

0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98

0.96

0.9

0.67

0.7

0.63

0.67 0.66
0.59

0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1

Decision Trees

kNN(k=11)

Naïve Bayes

Ensemble

Weighted AUC

Scan

Normal

DoS

Weighted AUC

Logistic Regression

Figure 10 : AUC value for each category for Bot-IoT
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IoTID20 Category Classification
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Figure 11: AUC for each category class for IoTID20

As observed from the above two figures, the models also perform and can
categorize the different attacks and normal instances for both the datasets. The
scores reported for decision tree, k-NN and ensemble are above 0.95 for both the
datasets.

4.2 Cross dataset evaluation results
The above models where then tested with cross-dataset for both binary and
category classification and the results are described below.
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4.2.1. Binary Classification
Binary classification was performed using the same models and the AUC weighted
average was calculated with cross-datasets.
The weighted AUC for binary classification with IoTID20 as train set and Bot-IoT as
test set and vice-versa are plotted in the below figures, Figure 12 and Figure 13
respectively.

Cross-dataset Binary Classification
Train set - IoTID20
Test set - Bot-IoT
1
0.9
0.8

Weighted AUC

0.7
0.6

0.57
0.51

0.51

kNN(n=31)

Naïve Bayes

0.5

0.48

0.5

Logistic
Regression

Ensemble

0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
DecisionTree

Figure 12 : Weighted AUC for Cross-dataset Binary Classification with IoTID20 as training set and Bot-IoT as test set
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Cross-dataset Binary Classification
Train set - Bot-IoT
Test set - IoTID20
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Figure 13 :Weighted AUC for Cross-dataset Binary Classification with Bot-IoT as training set and IoTID20 as test set

4.2.2. Category Classification
Category classification was performed using the same models and the AUC
weighted average was calculated for each category class. The evaluation was
performed with cross-datasets.
The AUC for each category attack and the weighted AUC with IoTID20 as train set
and Bot-IoT as test set and vice-versa are plotted in the below figures, respectively.
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Cross-dataset Category Classification
Train-set: IoTID20
Test-set : Bot-IoT
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Figure 14: AUC for Cross-dataset Category Classification with training set as IoTID20 and test set as Bot-IoT dataset

As it can be inferred from the above figure, the performance of the model is poor
compared to when the testing is performed within dataset.
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Cross-dataset Category Classification
Train-set : Bot-IoT
Test-set : IoTID20
1
0.784

0.77

0.75

0.8

0.65

0.7
0.548

AUC

0.6
0.5

0.88

0.87

0.9

0.48

0.543
0.47

0.66

0.61
0.546

0.5

0.522

0.49

0.48

0.37

0.4

0.33

0.3

0.3
0.2
0.1

Decision Trees

kNN(k=11)

Naïve Bayes

Logistic Regression

Weighted_AUC

Scan

Normal

DoS

Weighted_AUC

Scan

Normal

DoS

Weighted_AUC

Scan

Normal

DoS

Weighted_AUC

Scan

Normal

DoS

Weighted_AUC

Scan

Normal

DoS

0

Ensemble

Figure 15: AUC for Cross-dataset Category Classification with training set as Bot-IoT and test set as IoTID20 dataset

As it can be inferred from the above figure, the performance of the model is very
poor for normal instances as well as attack categories compared to when the
testing is performed within dataset.

4.3. Discussion
From the above results, it can be observed that binary and category classification
on the Bot-IoT dataset achieves high scores for all the methods except Naïve Bayes
and Logistic Regression. This is because attacks can be identified based on rules
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that can be easily learnt by decision trees, but it is not easy for probabilistic models
to learn. Similarly, binary and category classification on the IoTID20 dataset
achieves high scores for all methods except for Naïve Bayes. When the models are
trained with the IoTID20 dataset and tested with the Bot-IoT dataset, they perform
very poorly and cannot identify the normal instances. This is because normal data
generated by the dataset was done for using the network adaptor’s monitor mode.
This mode is limited to a single wireless channel and is prone to corrupted packets
as error detection is not performed, whereas the normal data in the Bot-IoT data
was generated using the Ostinato tool [40]. This tool can generate traffic via
multiple streams and capture traffic for different protocols and test errors. Hence
the IoTID20 was unable to generalize well for Bot-IoT. However, the models can
detect anomalies very well. An IDS built with these models would cause issues and
not allow normal or safe traffic to pass within the IoT network. In contrast, all the
models except for Naïve Bayes trained with the Bot-IoT dataset and tested with the
IoTID20 dataset perform relatively well but the AUC scores obtained are lower
compared to their performance tested with the same dataset. The decision trees
perform the best and can classify the normal and anomaly instances. Therefore,
cross-dataset evaluation for binary classification on both the datasets provide
lower AUC score compared to within dataset.
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Although the primary aim of an IDS is to perform anomaly detection, to better
understand the behavior of the models on the datasets, category classification is
performed. Logistic Regression performs better compared to the other methods
when trained with Bot-IoT and tested with IoTID20 and can capture the signal
needed to classify DoS and Scan attacks. The other models built using the Bot-IoT
dataset do not perform well with attack category classification for DoS and Scan.
The attacks simulation method on the Bot-IoT dataset differs from that of the
IoTID20 dataset and default packet sizes were used to simulate these attacks. On
the other hand, the models trained with IotID20 can categorize the attacks well but
fail with the normal instances. This is again because the dataset does not generalize
well with normal instances. This indicates that IDS created using the same training
and test data is likely to perform well but perform poorly when deployed because
the traffic for a given network when deployed can greatly differ from the simulated
data.

4.4. Challenges
A lot of shortcomings were observed as part of this research. We only found two
IoT intrusion detection network datasets that performed similar attacks and could
be used for comparison. In addition, most datasets simulated are done for different
attack categories. The test-bed setup, simulation methods and tools adopted for
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the generation of the dataset vary which can greatly alter model’s performance and
make it difficult to evaluate an IDS using cross-dataset. The data available cannot
be directly used for comparison because the features generated for different
datasets differ highly. Generating newer features from the raw packet files and
labelling them is a challenging task.
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5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
It is crucial to use the right way to evaluate the performance of a machine learning
model used to build an intrusion detection system. An IDS trained and tested using
a single dataset may not perform well when deployed as the data observed in real
life can vary a lot from the simulated data. The Bot-IoT dataset and IOTID20
datasets perform exceptionally well when trained and tested within the same
dataset because the train and test sets data distribution is similar. The results
obtained mislead the performance of the IDS as the model is bound to face
different data when deployed. When the models were trained with one dataset
and tested with another, the performance of the model declines because the
methods used for simulation are different across both the datasets. Performing
cross-dataset evaluation helps understand that the IDS generated with the same
simulated data does not generalize well when tested with attacks simulated
differently that is adversaries may intrude into the network using novel methods
which the simulated data does not reflect.
To be able to develop a strong IDS using simulated data, it is important to train the
model with different types of data and simulation, so that the IDS can generalize
well when deployed. Future work includes to generate a dataset that contains
similar attacks simulated using different methods to help generalize well, train a
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single model with different datasets to reflect all possible attack simulations. One
can also perform cross-dataset evaluations with a greater number of datasets to
ensure that the IDS built is strong and perform well when its deployed in
production.
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